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Abstract
Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, that when
added to an input, can cause high confidence misclassifications. The adversarial
learning research community has made remarkable progress in the understanding
of the root causes of adversarial perturbations. However, most problems that one
may consider important to solve for the deployment of machine learning in safety
critical tasks involve high dimensional complex manifolds that are difficult to
characterize and study. It is common to develop adversarially robust learning
theory on simple problems, in the hope that insights will transfer to ‘real world
datasets’. In this work, we discuss a setting where this approach fails. In particular,
we show with a linear classifier, it is always possible to solve a binary classification
problem on Gaussian data under arbitrary levels of adversarial corruption during
training, and that this property is not observed with non-linear classifiers on the
CIFAR-10 dataset.
1 Introduction & background
In the standard nomenclature of supervised machine learning, we let fθ : X → Rk, represent a
hypothesis, where k is the number of classes in the classification problem, and θ are parameters of the
hypothesis function. We associate this hypothesis with a loss function ` : Rk ×Y → R, that takes the
output of fθ as an input along with the true class, and outputs a ‘cost’ associated with the prediction.
Given a training set {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xn, yn)}, where (xi, yi) are independently drawn from
the joint distribution, (X ,Y), standard training through empirical risk minimization states we should
choose a hypothesis that solves:
arg min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(fθ(x
i), yi) (1)
By choosing a hypothesis that solves eq. (1), since the training set was drawn independently from
the joint distribution (X ,Y), we expect a small loss on other samples that will be drawn from this
distribution in the future, and consequently, the learned hypothesis to perform well on future data.
Adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017) has been proposed as a method to boost the performance of
a classifier against adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013; Biggio & Roli, 2018), by choosing a
hypothesis that solves:
arg min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
‖δi‖≤
`(fθ(x
i + δi), yi) (2)
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By choosing a hypothesis that solves eq. (2), we expect, for x ∈ X , the classification of fθ(x) is equal
to fθ(x+ δ), providing δ is small with respect to a norm, ‖·‖. Throughout this work, we consider
perturbations, δ, with an `∞ norm smaller than .
The adversarial learning research community has expended a great deal of effort to understand
generalization properties of machine learning models learnt with adversarial training. By studying
simple data models, one can understand how adversarial training affects the (standard and robust)
generalization error of a hypothesis. In particular, works in this space have studied the following
simple data and hypothesis models:
Data model. Let (x, y) ∈ Rd × {±1}, where y ∈ {±1} is sampled uniformly at random, and
x | y ∼ N (yµ, σ2I), where µ ∈ Rd+ and σ ∈ R+.
Hypothesis model. We consider the linear classifier Fθ(x) = sign(fθ(x)), where fθ(x) = 〈θ, x〉
and θ ∈ Rd.
Schmidt et al. (2018) show that under this simple data and hypothesis model, adversarial training
requires Ω(d) number of training samples, while standard training needs only a constant number of
training samples to reach a small generalization error. Tsipras et al. (2018a) show that in a similar
setting a trade-off between the test set accuracy of a model on standard inputs and its robustness to
adversarial perturbations provably exists, and demonstrated this phenomenon can be observed in
more complex data and hypothesis models. Nakkiran (2019) went on to prove that robustness may
come at the expense of simplicity, by demonstrating under a simple data model, there exists no linear
classifier that is robust to adversarial examples.
Chen et al. (2020) proved that under this data and hypothesis model, there exists cases where
adversarial training can cause the generalization gap between an adversarially trained classifier and a
standard classifier to increase and subsequently decrease with more training data, and cases where
more training data increases this gap. The exact behavior of the generalization gap as the size of
training set grows is dependent on the strength of the adversary (also referred to as the adversaries
perturbation budget) used in the inner-maximization in eq. (2) – that is, the choice of . Min et al.
(2020) showed under the same setting, depending on the choice of , as the number of training
inputs increases, the generalization error can either (1) monotonically decrease, (2) form a double
descent curve where the error decreases, increases and then decreases again, or (3) decrease and then
monotonically increase. Chen et al. (2020) and Min et al. (2020) proved these properties using a
linear loss function, that has also been studied in relation to other robustness properties by Khim &
Loh (2018) and Yin et al. (2018), and is defined by:
`(fθ(x), y) = −yfθ(x)
= −y〈θ, x〉 (3)
Contributions. In this work, we discuss why it may be insufficient to consider such simple data and
hypothesis models in the quest to understand how adversarial training affects the generalization error
on ‘real-world datasets’. We prove that in this simple setting, a linear classifier with a linear loss can
learn a hypothesis with a standard generalization error equal to the Bayes error rate, under adversarial
training with an arbitrarily large perturbation budget, . Additionally, we give empirical evidence this
result holds for other types of loss function. Since the perturbation budget can be arbitrarily large,
this implies that the classifier can learn under seemingly completely mislabeled data, a property we
show is not exhibited on an adversarially trained model on the CIFAR-10 dataset (Krizhevsky et al.,
2009). We argue for caution when studying adversarial training and related robustness properties
under these simple settings. It is not necessarily the case that they are informative of more general
properties of adversarial robustness that one may desire to understand.
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2 Further background
In this section, in addition to the aforementioned related work introduced in section 1, we briefly
survey some of the most relevant works on the generalization of adversarially robust models.
Similar to work by Tsipras et al. (2018a) and Nakkiran (2019), Papernot et al. (2016) formally
studied the trade-off between robustness, simplicity and accuracy, finding that adversarial example
vulnerability can manifest due to fundamental limitations in the expressivity of the hypothesis class,
and can be resolved by moving to a richer hypothesis class. The generalization error under adversarial
perturbations within an -ball (referred to as the robust error), is at least as large as standard test
set error. Using this observation, Zhang et al. (2019) studied the trade-off between robustness and
accuracy in a simple data model setting by decomposing the robust error into the sum of the standard
generalization error and the boundary error. The boundary error corresponds to how likely input
features are within an  distance to the decision boundary. By minimizing a differentiable upper
bound, they develop a new adversarial example defense that scales to large datasets such as tiny
ImageNet.
Dohmatob (2018) generalizes the results of Tsipras et al. (2018b) to a richer set of distributions,
showing that high test set accuracy is not sufficient to prove the absence of adversarial examples.
Raghunathan et al. (2019) further explore these trade-offs by showing adversarial training hurts
generalization even when the optimal predictor has both optimal standard and robust accuracy, and
show incorporating unlabeled data in training, as introduced by (Carmon et al., 2019; Najafi et al.,
2019; Alayrac et al., 2019), reduces adversarial example vulnerability. Raghunathan et al. (2020)
continue this investigation, developing a theoretical characterization of the trade-off between standard
and robust error in linear regression that motivates the incorporation of unlabeled data in training as a
method to improve robust error without sacrificing standard error.
Other works explore adversarial robustness through the lens of randomization (Pinot et al., 2019),
computational hardness (Bubeck et al., 2018; Gourdeau et al., 2019; Mahloujifar & Mahmoody,
2018), statistical and PAC learning (Diochnos et al., 2019; Cullina et al., 2018; Montasser et al.,
2019), and optimal transport theory (Bhagoji et al., 2019; Li et al., 2018; Pydi & Jog, 2019).
Importantly, our results do not contradict works on the fundamental robustness-accuracy trade-off.
Our work shows it is possible to achieve perfect test set accuracy under any perturbation budget
used in adversarial training. We make no comment on the robustness of the final classifier under the
data model introduced in section 1. Typically, robustness-accuracy trade-offs are explored under the
assumption that the adversarial perturbation budget is small in comparison to the possible space of
feature values. In our work, the semantic definition of an adversarial example is blurred, since during
training, the perturbation budget is large enough such that the perturbed dataset is equivalent to a
mislabeling of each data point.
3 A linear classifier has small generalization error if θ is positive
We begin by showing that, under the previously introduced data and hypothesis model, if the learnt
parameter θ is positive, then the linear classifier has a generalization error equal to the Bayes error
rate. We first give an intuitive analysis of why in one dimension and the proceed to generalize to the
higher dimensional case.
Figure 1 gives an illustration of the data model defined in section 1 for d = 1. The Bayes error is
given by the red shaded region, and clearly the optimum decision boundary is centered at µ+(−µ)2 = 0.
The Bayes error rate of this data model can be written as:
Perror =
1
2
∫ 0
−∞
P (x|y = 1)dx+ 1
2
∫ ∞
0
P (x|y = −1)dx
=
1
2
∫ 0
−∞
1√
2piσ
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx+
1
2
∫ ∞
0
1√
2piσ
e−
(x+µ)2
2σ2 dx
=
1
2
(
1− erf( µ√
2σ
)
)
(4)
3
0Figure 1: Illustration of a one dimensional Gaussian data model introduced in section 1. The red
shaded region under the curve corresponds to the prediction errors incurred by the Bayes classifier.
Since the optimal decision boundary is at zero, the linear classifier will achieve the minimal possible
generalization error if fθ(x) does not flip the sign of the input, which is equivalent to constraining θ
to be positive. The signed linear classifier achieves the Bayes error rate if sign(θ) = 1.
We now show the zero vector is the optimal decision boundary in d > 1 dimensions, and that as
d grows, if θ > 0, the probability that sign(θTx) 6= sign(x) shrinks to zero. Thus the Bayes error
tends to zero and it is achieved when θ > 0.
Proposition 1. If θ > 0, then we achieve the Bayes error rate in d dimensions.
Proof. Let x ∈ Rd, so if y = 1, x is sampled from a Gaussian with pdf equal to
1
(2pi)
d
2 σ
exp (− 12 (x− µ)Tσ2I(x− µ)). Similarly if y = −1, x is sampled from a Gaussian with pdf
equal to 1
(2pi)
d
2 σ
exp (− 12 (x+ µ)Tσ2I(x+ µ)).
The Bayes decision rule is found at:
P (y = 1 | x) = P (y = −1 | x) (5)
=⇒ log( P (y = 1 | x)
P (y = −1 | x) ) = 0 (6)
=⇒ log( P (x | y = 1)
P (x | y = −1)) = 0 since P (y = 1) = P (y = −1) (7)
=⇒ 2
σ2
µTx ≷ 0 (8)
Note that 2σ2µ
Tx > 0 ⇐⇒ x > 0 and 2σ2µTx < 0 ⇐⇒ x < 0, since 2σ2µT > 0. Clearly then,
we again have a decision rule that is optimal if the sign of x is not flipped. That is, for θ ∈ Rd,
sign(
∑d
j=1 θjxj) = sign(
∑d
j=1 xj).
In the case where ∀j ∈ [d], µj = µ, we have
∑d
j=1 xj ∼ N (dyµ, dσ2I). Without loss of generality,
let y = 1, then P (
∑d
j=1 xj > 0) = Φ(
√
dµ
σ ). As d → ∞, Φ(
√
dµ
σ ) → 1, and so P (
∑d
j=1 θjxj >
0)→ 1 if θ > 0. Clearly then any θ > 0 gives the Bayes optimal classifier in d dimensions and the
Bayes error approaches zero as d increases.
In sum, to show a linear classifier achieves the smallest generalization error under adversarial training,
we must show it is more likely that the learned parameter θj is positive, ∀j ∈ [d], under any adversarial
perturbation budget, .
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4 A linear classifier can have perfect standard test set accuracy under
adversarial training with any  > 0
We show here that it is more likely that a linear classifier with a linear loss optimizing eq. (2) via
gradient descent will learn positive parameters, θ, for a sufficiently large number of training steps.
We first note that for the linear loss, the inner-maximization term in eq. (2) can be solved exactly:
max‖δ‖∞≤ `(fθ(x+ δ), y) = −y〈θ, x〉+ ‖θ‖1. For j ∈ [d], denote the value of jth index of θ, at
the kth iteration of gradient descent, as θkj . We have
∂`
∂θj
= −yxj +  sign(θj), and so for a given
learning rate, η, we have the following relation:
θk+1j = θ
k
j + η
(
yxj −  sign(θkj )
)
(9)
Note that, in expectation, Exj∼N (yµj ,σ2)[yxj ] = µj , and thus, on average, gradient descent obeys
the following relation:
θk+1j =

θkj + η(µj + ), if θ
k
j < 0
θkj + ηµj , if θ
k
j = 0
θkj + η(µj − ), if θkj > 0
(10)
Throughout this work, we consider an initial θ1j ∼ N (0, σ2I), and so
sign(θ1j ) =
{−1, w.p 1/2
+1, w.p 1/2
(11)
Firstly, if 0 <  < µj , then limk→∞ θkj = ∞. Thus, the linear classifier found by optimizing
a linear loss approaches the Bayes error rate if, during adversarial training, the adversary cannot,
in expectation, change the sign of an input. Before we show that it is more likely that a linear
classifier optimizing eq. (2) can achieve a generalization error equal to the Bayes error rate under any
adversarial perturbation budget, we motivate our findings by way of example:
Example 1. Let θkj = r, where r is positive but negligible, η =
1
2 ,  =
3
2µ, µ = 1.
Then θkj = r → θk+1j = r − 14 → θk+2j = r + 1 → θk+3j = r + 34 → θk+4j = r + 12 → θk+5j =
r + 14 → θk+6j = r. Thus, only {θk+1j } is negative while {θkj , θk+2j , θk+3j , θk+4j , θk+5j } are all
positive. If we train for m steps, where m is a large integer chosen at random, it is five times more
likely that the final learned parameter, θmj , is positive. Thus, it is more likely gradient descent will
output a classifier that achieves small generalization error.
We now formalize the above example. Firstly, by proving that if  > µj , then zero is an attraction
point in eq. (10).
Proposition 2. Let  > µj , then ∀n ∈ N, ∃n0 ≥ n such that θn0j < 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let θnj > 0, otherwise we can take n0 to be n. By eq. (10),
the sequence θnj → θn+1j → θn+2j → · · · is decreasing until, for some m ∈ N, θn+mj < 0 or
θn+mj = 0. If θ
n+m
j < 0 we take n0 to be n + m. Otherwise, if θ
n+m
j = 0, then θ
n+m+1
j = ηµj
and θn+m+2j = η(2µj − ). Similarly, if  > 2µj , then θn+m+2j < 0.
Now, we focus on the case where θn+m+2j = η(2µj − ) > 0. Observe that, for s ∈ N, under the
assumption that we have not observed a negative value before θn+m+sj , then θ
n+m+s
j = η(sµj −
(s − 1)). Now, θn+m+sj = η(sµj − (s − 1)) > 0 when  < ss−1µj . However, in the limit,
lims→∞ ss−1µj = µj , and given that we assume µj < , there exists s0, such that θ
n+m+s0
j < 0.
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Using an almost identical argument, it is easy to show ∀n ∈ N, ∃n0 ≥ n such that θn0j > 0, and
so θkj oscillates around zero as k → ∞. However, the next proposition illustrates that, providing
 > µj , as the number of iterations of gradient descent increases, it decreases in probability that the
learned parameter, θj , is negative. This is because after a sufficient number of iterations, whenever
the learned parameters turns negative, since  > µj , the parameter value at the following iteration
is guaranteed to be positive. After this, we show the converse doesn’t hold; for any  > µj and a
sufficiently large number of training steps, it does not always hold that the next parameter in gradient
descent is negative if the preceding parameter is positive.
Proposition 3. Assuming µj < , let n denote the minimum index where θnj < 0 and n > n0, where
n0 is the first index satisfying θn0j > 0. That is, if θ
1
j > 0, then n0 = 1 and we consider the smallest
n > n0 satisfying θnj < 0. Otherwise, if θ
1
j < 0, then let n0 be the minimum index satisfying θ
n0
j > 0,
and so n is the minimum index greater than n0 satisfying θnj < 0. Then, θ
n+1
j > 0, and ∀k ∈ N,
θn+kj < 0 =⇒ θn+k+1j > 0.
Proof. ∀k ∈ N where θn+kj < 0, we have the lower bound η(µj − ) < θn+kj . Then, 2ηµj <
θn+k+1j .
The following proposition shows that, providing µj <  < tµj for t > 1, during gradient descent
there exists consecutive positive parameter values. Taking proposition 3 and proposition 4 together,
for a sufficiently large number of training steps it is more likely that gradient descent ends with a
learnt positive parameter than a negative parameter, which in turn implies a classifier that is accurate
on unseen data from the Gaussian data model.
Proposition 4. Let n denote the minimum index satisfying θnj < 0 and n > n0, where n0 is the first
index satisfying θn0j > 0. If µj <  < tµj , where t > 1, then there ∃k ∈ N with k > n such that
θkj > 0 and θ
k+1
j > 0.
Proof. We note that θnj is lower bounded by η(µj − ). Let us assume there is no k ∈ N, with k > n,
such that θkj > 0 and θ
k+1
j > 0. Then {θnj , θn+1j , θn+2j , θn+3j , θn+4j , . . . } is lower bounded by the
sequence {η(µj − ), 2ηµj , η(3µj − ), 4ηµj , η(5µj − ), . . . }. In particular, ∀s ∈ N with s ≡ 1
mod 2, we have θn+sj > ηsµj , and θ
n+s+1
j > η((s + 1)µj − ). By assumption, θn+s+1j < 0,
however, taking
s =
{dte, if dte ≡ 0 mod 2
dte+ 1, if dte ≡ 1 mod 2 (12)
we have θn+sj > 0 and θ
n+s+1
j > η((s+ 1)µj − ) > 0, since  < tµj < (s+ 1)µj .
5 Experiments
We now give empirical results on the ability for a linear classifier to learn on the Gaussian data model
under  > µj . Firstly, we set d = 1, µ = 1, σ2 = 1, η = 0.001, and set the number of gradient
descent iterations to 100K, sampling a new input from the Gaussian data model at each iteration. For
 ∈ [0, 20], we visualize the number of iterations during gradient descent where θ > 0, implying an
accurate classifier is learnt at these iterations, and the number of iterations at which θ < 0. Figure 2a
and fig. 2b show for a linear and cross-entropy loss function, respectively, if 0 <  < 20, the number
of occurrences where θ is positive during gradient descent exceed the number of negative occurrences.
Thus, even if  is 20× larger than µ, it is more likely the final classifier has a small generalization
error than a large generalization error. However, clearly the probability of learning a highly accurate
classifier decreases as  increases. As →∞, it is less likely that consecutive gradient descent steps
both have positive parameter values, and so the count of positive and negative parameter values during
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Figure 2: The number of iterations during gradient descent, referred to as counts, where θ > 0 and
where θ < 0, for 0 <  < 20, with µ = 1, using either the linear or cross-entropy loss function.
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(c) Hinge loss, average θ.
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(d) Linear loss, test accuracy.
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(e) Cross-entropy loss, test accuracy.
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(f) Hinge loss, test accuracy.
Figure 3: The average value of θ and test accuracy for a 100d Gaussian data model with µ = 1,
σ2 = 1, for  > µ.
training→ number of gradient descent steps/2. The test set accuracy for the linear loss (on 100K samples) at
 = 0 and  = 20, is 84.12% and 84.06%, respectively. Note, that by eq. (4), the maximum possible
test set accuracy is 1− 12
(
1− erf( 1√
2
)
)
, which is equal to 84.13%.
Next, we empirically demonstrate the ability to learn with large  on a higher dimensional Gaussian
data model for the linear loss, cross-entropy loss, and hinge loss. For every j ∈ [d], we set µj = µ = 1,
σ2 = 1, η = 0.001, and set d = 100. We set both the number of training and test inputs to 100K,
and set the number of epochs to 200. Figure 3 shows both the average value of θ and the test set
accuracy throughout training, for values of  greater than µ. Firstly, we observe that for both the
hinge and linear loss, the average value of θ oscillates around the learning rate, η. For larger  values,
the oscillations are greater in magnitude and occasionally fall below zero – this is also true for the
cross-entropy loss where the average value of θ oscillates around zero. For  = 32µ, 2µ, 4µ, we
achieve perfect test set accuracy after approximately 10 epochs, for each choice of loss function.
For  = 10µ, the linear loss and cross-entropy loss function results in an average test set accuracy
of between 80-90%. The test set accuracy when using the hinge loss oscillates more dramatically,
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Figure 4: Test accuracy for an adversarially trained model on CIFAR-10.
ranging from 0% at approximately epoch 80, to 100% at approximately epoch 175. These two values
correspond to the extremes of the average value of θ in fig. 3c.
Thus, it is possible to achieve perfect test set accuracy even when the adversarial budget causes inputs
to appear to be completely mislabeled during training. For completeness, we plot corresponding
average values of θ and test set accuracy for  values smaller than µ in appendix A. As one may
expect, for 0 ≤  < µ, the average value of θ monotonically increases, and the classifier achieves
perfect test set accuracy.
The phenomenon of being able to learn under an adversary that can perturb an input by an arbitrary
amount does not transfer to more complex datasets. In fig. 4, we plot the accuracy of a ResNet-
18 classifier (He et al., 2016) on the CIFAR-10 test set (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) that has been
adversarially trained using projected gradient descent (Madry et al., 2017) with large values of 
( = 32255 ,
127
255 ,
255
255 ). The learning rate was set to 0.1 and annealed to 0.01 and 0.001 at epochs 100
and 150, respectively, and we set the number of attack iterations in projected gradient descent to ten.
This corresponds to an adversary that can significantly distort the true value of each pixel during
training. At  = 127255 ,
255
255 , the classifier is unable to learn and the test set accuracy does not grow
above 10% – this corresponds to a classifier that guesses the label of an input uniformly at random.
We plot examples of inputs at these values of  in appendix B.
6 Conclusion
Due to the difficulty in characterizing complex high dimensional manifolds, it is attractive to defer to
simple datasets in adversarial robustness research. The hope being that insights made in these simple
scenarios will be reflected in more ‘interesting’ datasets and can be observed empirically. This work
serves as a caution against such lines of reasoning; it is not always the case that theoretical insights of
adversarial robustness in simple data settings will transfer to other datasets. In particular, we show
that when the task is to learn a simple binary classification problem on Gaussian data, it is possible
to achieve perfect standard test accuracy, when the classifier is trained with data perturbed by an
arbitrarily strong adversary. Thus, it is possible to achieve zero generalization error even if the data is
almost entirely mislabeled. As one may expect, this is not a property that transfers to more realistic
problems in computer vision such as classification of CIFAR-10 images.
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A More experimental results on Gaussian data
Here, we plot analogous results to fig. 3 for cases where the perturbation used in adversarial training,
, is smaller than µ. Figure 5 plots test accuracy and expected value of the parameter, θ, for  = 34µ,
 = 910µ, and  = µ, while fig. 6 plots test accuracy and expected value of the parameter, θ, for  = 0
(standard training),  = 110µ,  =
1
4µ, and  =
1
2µ.
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Figure 5: The average value of θ and test accuracy for a 100d Gaussian data model with µ = 1,
σ2 = 1, for µ2 <  ≤ µ.
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Figure 6: The average value of θ and test accuracy for a 100d Gaussian data model with µ = 1,
σ2 = 1, for 0 <  ≤ µ2 .
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B More experimental results on CIFAR-10 data
In fig. 7, we plot qualitative samples of deformations caused by perturbations applied in adversarial
training as detailed in the CIFAR-10 experiments in section 5.
(a)  = 0 (b)  = 32
255
(c)  = 127
255
(d)  = 255
255
Figure 7: Examples of CIFAR-10 images at various levels of distortion.
C A linear classifier with a linear loss cannot learn a shifted intercept
Here, we discuss further ‘weakness’ of the linear loss function. Let us re-define the Gaussian data
model as follows. Let (x, y) ∈ Rd × {±1}, where y ∈ {±1} is sampled uniformly at random, and
x | y = 1 ∼ N (µ1, σ2I), x | y = −1 ∼ N (µ2, σ2I), where 0 < µ2 < µ1 and σ2 > 0. This
problem is not learnable when using fθ(x) = 〈θ, x〉+b with loss function `1(fθ, y) = −y(〈θ, x〉+b),
while the problem becomes tractable by using the hinge loss, `2(fθ, y) = max(0,−y(〈θ, x〉+ b)).
The problem stems from ∂`1∂b = −y and in expectation this is equal to zero since y = ±1 with
probability 1/2. So the intercept parameter, b, will not be updated, and so if initialized by a standard
Gaussian, will remain centered at zero.
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